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1  Introduction 
One of the main features of the National Credit Act,
1  which came into full 
operation on 1 June 2007,
2 is its objective to afford debt relief to over-burdened 
consumers. Otto remarks that the NCA is an ambitious, perhaps even idealistic, 
piece of legislation with pronounced socio-economic aims.
3 The purpose of the 
NCA as stated in section 3 thereof is inter alia to promote responsibility in the 
credit market by encouraging responsible borrowing, avoidance of over-
indebtedness and fulfilment of financial obligations by consumers, and to 
discourage reckless credit granting by credit providers and contractual default 
by consumers.
4  It aims to address and prevent over-indebtedness of 
consumers and provides mechanisms for resolving over-indebtedness based 
on the principle of satisfaction by the consumer of all responsible financial 
obligations.
5
 
 
Over-indebtedness is addressed by providing for debt review and the 
restructuring of credit agreement debt. Whilst the consumer is under debt 
                                            
*  B Proc LLB LLM LLD, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria. 
**   B Iur LLB LLM LLD, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria. 
1   Act 34 of 2005 (hereinafter the 'NCA' or the 'Act'). 
2   S 172(4) of the NCA repeals the Usury Act 73 of 1968, the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 
1980 and the Integration of Usury Laws Act 57 of 1996. See further Scholtz et al Guide to 
the National Credit Act par 2.2. 
3   Otto National Credit Act explained; Scholtz et al (n 2) par 2.3. 
4   S 3(c)(i) and (ii). 
5   S 3(g). The NCA provides for debt restructuring in accordance with s 86(7(c) but does not 
afford a consumer a discharge, for instance, after a certain period. C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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review or subject to a debt restructuring order or agreement, the credit provider 
is not entitled to exercise or enforce his rights or security under the agreement 
by means of litigation or any other judicial process.
6  Provisions relating to 
individual debt enforcement by means of judgment and repossession are set 
out in Part C of Chapter 6 of the NCA and it is clear that a credit provider will 
not be able to proceed with such litigation to enforce his rights or security under 
a credit agreement against a consumer who is under debt review, or subject to 
a debt restructuring order or agreement.
7 In order to promote sensible lending 
practices, reckless credit granting is met with severe sanctions which include 
complete or partial setting aside of the consumer's rights and obligations under 
the agreement, or suspension of the force and effect of the agreement in 
accordance with section 83(3)(b)(i).
8
 
  It is clear that a person who is 
overburdened with debt, be that credit agreement debt that is regulated by the 
NCA or other debt, may consider sequestration by means of voluntary 
surrender as an option to deal with his or her debt situation. One or more of 
such a debtor's creditors may also consider an application for compulsory 
sequestration of his or her estate. The question thus inevitably arises what the 
effect of debt review and debt restructuring, where applicable, is with regard to 
insolvency law in general and sequestration in particular.  
Insolvency law brings about a concursus creditorum that entails a collective 
debt settlement procedure that, unlike the NCA, does not operate on the 
principle of extension or restructuring  of payment to achieve eventual 
satisfaction of debts. The role and function of having some credit agreements 
declared reckless may also affect insolvency proceedings, since a declaration 
of reckless credit can lead to punitive measures against the creditor that may 
be of some benefit to the debtor. 
 
                                            
6  S 88(3). 
7  See s 130(3)(c)(i), 130(4)(c ). 
8  S 83(2). C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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The purpose of this article is therefore to investigate the impact of the debt 
relief remedies in the NCA on insolvency law with specific reference to the 
following questions: 
(a)  Does the NCA exclude the application of the Insolvency Act
9
(b)  If not, what is the effect of section 88(3) of the NCA with regard to 
the application of the Insolvency Act? 
 as 
being in conflict with the principle of satisfaction of all responsible 
financial obligations by an over-indebted consumer? 
(c)  To what extent must a court in insolvency proceedings consider 
the concepts of over-indebtedness and reckless credit and their 
related debt relief remedies when considering applications for 
voluntary surrender or compulsory sequestration in terms of the 
Insolvency Act? 
 
These questions will be considered against the backdrop of a summary of 
some of the salient provisions of the NCA.  
 
 
2  Over-indebtedness, reckless credit and the debt relief measures in 
terms of the NCA 
2.1  Over-indebtedness 
Part D of Chapter 4 of the NCA deals with over-indebtedness and reckless 
credit and the debt relief measures afforded in respect thereof. This Part 
applies only to natural person consumers and is not available to a consumer 
who is a juristic person.
10
                                            
9   Act 24 of 1936 (hereafter the 'Insolvency Act'). 
  Over-indebtedness has a very specific meaning 
within the context of the NCA as it applies only to credit agreement debt to 
10   S 78(1). 'Juristic person' has an extended definition in terms of the NCA and includes a 
partnership, association or other body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, or a trust if 
there are three or more individual trustees or the trustee itself is a juristic person, but does 
not include a stokvel. C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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which the Act applies.
11 For purposes of the Act, a natural person consumer is 
over-indebted if the preponderance of available information at the time a 
determination is made
12
 
  indicates that the particular consumer is or will be 
unable to satisfy in a timely manner all of the obligations under all of the credit 
agreements to which the consumer is a party, having regard to that 
consumer's: 
(a)  financial means, prospects and obligations;
13
(b)  probable propensity to satisfy in a timely manner all of  the 
obligations under all of  the credit agreements to which the 
consumer is a party, as indicated by the consumer's history of 
debt repayment.
 and 
14
 
 
Over-indebtedness thus relates  not only to existing inability to satisfy 
obligations but it also extends to future or proximate inability; hence the words 
"or will be unable to satisfy" in section 79(1).
15
 
  
2.1.1    Debt relief for over-indebtedness 
Over-indebtedness is addressed essentially by providing for debt relief in the 
form of debt restructuring. Courts are given the power in section 85 of the Act to 
declare and relieve over-indebtedness. Section 86 provides for an application 
for debt review by a debt counsellor. Debt review and debt restructuring denote 
two distinct stages of the debt relief process. The initial stage occurs before the 
                                            
11   For the scope and application of the NCA see Scholtz et al (n 2) ch 4. See also Stoop 
2008 De Jure 352.  
12   See Scholtz et al  (n 2) par 11.3.2. When a determination is to be made whether a 
consumer is over-indebted or not, the person making that determination must apply the 
criteria set out in s 79(1) "as they exist at the time a determination is being made". Such 
determination is made only at the stage when the issue of over-indebtedness is raised. 
This implies that a determination of general over-indebtedness is not made retrospective 
to the time the credit agreement was entered into, but only at the time at which the issue of 
over-indebtedness is raised. 
13   See s 78(3) for an explanation of "financial means, prospects and obligations". 
14   S 79(1)(a) and (b). 
15   Scholtz et al (n 2) par 11.3.2.  C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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debt counsellor and is referred to as debt review (or debt counselling)
16
 
 and the 
second stage comprises of an actual declaration of over-indebtedness and the 
subsequent restructuring, which is done by the court, alternatively on the filing 
of a consent order in terms of section 138 of the NCA. Consumers who are 
over-indebted thus have the option of taking the initiative and applying to a debt 
counsellor for debt review once they realise they are over-indebted. Where 
defaulting consumers have not themselves taken the initiative of approaching a 
debt counsellor, the credit provider may decide to institute court proceedings 
against them in order to enforce the credit agreement. The credit provider is 
then obliged prior to enforcement in terms of Part C of Chapter 6 to give them 
notice in terms of section 129(1)(a) of the Act that they can inter alia approach 
a debt counsellor. Consumers can also raise the issue of over-indebtedness in 
court in accordance with section 85.  
Section 85 gives the court the discretion despite any provision of law or 
agreement to the contrary, in any court proceedings in which a credit 
agreement is being considered, if it is alleged that the consumer under a credit 
agreement is over-indebted, to refer the matter directly to a debt counsellor with 
a request that the latter evaluate the consumer's circumstances and make a 
recommendation to the court in terms of section 86(7).
17 Alternatively the court 
itself may declare that the consumer is over-indebted and make any order 
contemplated in section 87 to relieve the consumer's over-indebtedness.
18
   
 
In  Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales
19
                                            
16   Also referred to as 'debt counselling'. Reg 1 defines debt counselling as "performing the 
functions contemplated in section 86 of the Act". 
  the plaintiff successfully 
foreclosed on a mortgage bond after the defendant (consumer) relied on 
section 85 of the NCA by raising over-indebtedness as a defence. The court 
dealt with the discretion of the court to refer a matter to a debt counsellor in 
terms of section 85 of the NCA. The court firstly ruled that section 85(a) 
17   S 85(a). The word 'may' is used. 
18   S 85(b). See the discussion in par 2.2.1 below. 
19   2009 (3) SA 315 (D). C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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empowers a court to refer a matter to a debt counsellor for a recommendation 
when (1) the proceedings before the court relate to a credit agreement, and (2) 
it is alleged during such proceedings that a consumer under the credit 
agreement is over-indebted.
20 When these two factors are present the court 
has a discretion to refer the matter to a debt counsellor to make a 
recommendation to the court in terms of section 86(7) of the NCA. In order to 
exercise its discretion the legislature did not, however, list specific factors to be 
taken into consideration by the court in this regard. According to the court, the 
purposes of the NCA as stated in section 3 and other relevant sections are 
merely intended to serve as a backdrop against which the court must exercise 
its discretion.
21 After deciding that it is neither the sole nor the chief purpose of 
the NCA to protect consumers, the court indicated that there must be a 
balancing act of rights and responsibilities of both consumers and credit 
providers.
22 Based on the available facts the court refused to refer the matter to 
a debt counsellor on the premise that it was not feasible to extend the mortgage 
bond debt further, or for the consumer to recover financially after a further 
suspension of instalments. In fact the court indicated that a further extension 
could even increase the indebtedness in the absence of a financial recovery.
23 
Since there appeared to be little potential for the consumer to  successfully 
reschedule the indebtedness, the court refused to refer the matter to a debt 
counsellor. In its summary the court stated that when exercising its discretion to 
refer a matter to a debt counsellor a court may look at the following factors, 
which are not an exhaustive list:
24
                                            
20   Ibid par 6-7. 
 the circumstances in which the debt was 
incurred; any attempts made by the debtor to pay of the debt; the financial 
situation of the parties; the amount of the debt; whether the debtor is employed 
or has a source of income to pay off the debt; and any other factor relevant to 
the facts of the particular case before the court.  
21   Ibid par 12, 22 and 26. See also Firstrand Bank Ltd v Olivier 2009 (3) SA 353 par 14 and 
23-24 regarding the exercising of the court's discretion in this regard. 
22   Ibid par 13. 
23   Ibid para 22-23. 
24   Ibid par 60. C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
28/161 
 
 
It should be noted that only a court can declare a consumer over-indebted and 
make an order for debt restructuring,  as explained hereinafter. A debt 
counsellor is merely empowered to conduct a debt review to determine if a 
consumer is over-indebted and if  any reckless credit has been extended to 
such a consumer. 
 
2.2  Debt Review 
The procedure for debt review is set out in section 86 of the NCA, read together 
with regulations 24 to 26. In brief, debt review has commenced when a 
consumer applies to a debt counsellor
25 for an evaluation to determine whether 
the consumer is over-indebted. The debt review process is quite detailed and 
comprises various stages, namely the consumer's application for debt review, 
the subsequent duties of the debt counsellor, the obligations of the consumer 
and credit providers during the debt review process, the debt counsellor's 
determination of over-indebtedness, and steps that may be taken after such 
determination. The Act also provides for termination of debt review in certain 
circumstances.
26
 
  
2.2.1  Declaration of over-indebtedness and debt restructuring 
The main aim of debt review is to determine whether or not a consumer is over-
indebted and whether or not reckless credit has been extended to him or her. 
During a debt review, on the initiative of the consumer or in pursuance of a 
                                            
25   S 44. 
26   S 86(10) provides that if a consumer is in default under a credit agreement that is being 
reviewed in terms of s 86, the credit provider in respect of that credit agreement may give 
notice to terminate the review in the prescribed manner to the consumer, the debt 
counsellor and the National Credit Regulator. Such notice may be given only  after 60 
business days after the date on which the consumer applied for the review. However, the 
irony is that the termination of the debt review does not mean that the consumer forfeits 
any further opportunity for debt relief. In this regard s 86(11) is quite significant as it 
provides that if a credit provider who has given notice to terminate a review as 
contemplated in s 86(10) proceeds to enforce that agreement in terms of Part C of Chapter 
6, the magistrate's court hearing the matter may order that the debt review resume on any 
conditions the court considers just in the circumstances. C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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section 129(1)(a) notice or as a result of a referral by the court in terms of 
section 85, a debt counsellor may thus make any of the following 
determinations: 
 
(a)  A determination that the consumer is not over-indebted 
In this instance the debt counsellor must reject the consumer's application for 
debt review even if  the debt counsellor has concluded that a particular 
agreement was reckless at the time it was entered into.
27 However, all hope of 
debt relief is not lost to the consumer, as section 86(9) provides that if a debt 
counsellor rejects an application for debt review as indicated in section 86(7), 
the consumer with the leave of the Magistrate's Court may apply directly to the 
Magistrate's Court for an order contemplated in section 86(7)(c). Such an order 
may declare one or more credit agreements to be reckless credit and may 
restructure one or more of the credit agreements.
28
 
  
(b)   A determination that the consumer is not over-indebted yet,  but is 
experiencing or likely to experience problems in future 
In such an instance the debt counsellor may recommend that the consumer 
and the respective credit providers voluntarily consider and agree on a plan of 
debt re-arrangement.
29 If a debt counsellor makes a recommendation in terms 
of section 86(7)(b) and the consumer and each credit provider concerned 
accept that proposal, the debt counsellor must record the proposal in the form 
of an order.
30
                                            
27   S 86(7)(a). 
 If it is consented to by the consumer and each credit provider 
concerned, the order must then be filed as a consent order in terms of section 
28   For a detailed discussion see Scholtz et al (n 2) par 11.3.3.2(i).  
29   S 86(7)(b). As indicated, s 86(5) obliges credit providers to participate in good faith in the 
review and in any negotiations designed to result in responsible debt arrangement. 
30   S 86(8)(a). See also reg 24(9) which provides that any arrangement made by the debt 
counsellor with credit providers must be reduced to writing and signed by all credit 
providers mentioned, the debt counsellor and the consumer. C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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138.
31  Should the debt counsellor's proposal not be accepted, the debt 
counsellor must refer  the matter to the Magistrate's Court together with the 
recommendation.
32
 
 
(c) A determination that the consumer is over-indebted 
If, as a result of the debt review assessment conducted by the debt counsellor, 
he or she reasonably concludes that the consumer is over-indebted, the debt 
counsellor may issue a proposal recommending that the Magistrate's Court 
make an order that the consumer's credit agreements be declared to be 
reckless credit,
33 and/or
34 that one or more of the consumer's obligations be re-
arranged.
35
 
  Section 86(7)(c)(ii) provides that the court may  rearrange the 
consumer's obligations in the following ways: 
(i)  by extending the period of the agreement and reducing the 
amount of each payment due accordingly;
36
(ii)  by postponing during a specified period the dates on which 
payments are due under the agreement;
 
37
(iii)  by extending the period of the agreement and postponing during a 
specified period the dates on which payments are due under the 
agreement;
 
38
(iv)  by  re-calculating the consumer's obligations because of 
contraventions of Part A or B of Chapter 5 or Part A of Chapter 
6.
 or 
39
                                            
31   S 86(8)(a). S 138(1) provides that if a matter has been (a) resolved through the ombud 
with jurisdiction, consumer court or alternative dispute resolution agent; or (b) investigated 
by the National Credit Regulator and the respondent agrees to the proposed terms of an 
appropriate order, the Tribunal or a court, without hearing any evidence, may confirm that 
resolution or agreement as a consent order. S 138(2) further provides that, with the 
consent of a complainant, a consent order confirmed in terms of s 138(1)(b) may include 
an award of damages to the complainant. 
 
32   S 86(8)(b).  
33   S 86(7)(c)(i).  
34   S 87(6)(c) – either or both. 
35   S 87(6)(c)(ii). 
36   S 86(7)(c)(ii)(aa).  
37   S 86(7)(c)(ii)(bb). 
38   S 86(7)(c)(ii)(cc). C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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The debt restructuring process poses a number of problems, due mainly to a 
lack of procedural clarity. The Act imposes no time limitation upon such 
restructuring with the result that restructuring orders that run over unrealistically 
long periods of time are sometimes granted by courts.
40 However, no provision 
is made for the discharge of debt after a certain period of payment, or 
repayment of a certain amount of the original debt. It is unclear what a credit 
provider's remedies are if he or she is of the opinion that the period of 
restructuring is unreasonably long and not to his benefit. It is submitted that as 
the procedure currently stands a credit provider will be able to contest debt 
restructuring only in respect of a consumer who has in fact been declared over-
indebted by a court on the basis that the consumer has enough money 
available to make larger payments than is proposed to the court. As the object 
of debt restructuring is fulfilment of financial obligations without any time limit or 
the possibility of a discharge being linked thereto, it appears that a credit 
provider is in dire straits and will have to accept the payments in terms of the 
proposed restructuring ordered by the court even if it has the effect that a debt 
takes the whole of the consumer's lifetime to settle. In this regard the practical 
difficulties experienced with other debt relief measures like the administration 
order in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act,
41 are bound to arise 
within the ambit of debt relief as well.
42
 
  
As long as the consumer pays in terms of the debt restructuring order, the 
credit provider will not be able to approach a court to review the order since the 
procedure does not provide for the order to be reviewed after a specified period 
                                                                                                                               
39   S 86(7)(c)(ii)(dd). Part A of Chapter 5 deals with unlawful agreements and provisions and 
Part B of Chapter 5 deals with the disclosure, form and effect of credit agreements. Part A 
of Chapter 6 deals with collection and repayment practices. 
40   An example on file with the authors grants a restructuring period of 832 months in the case 
of a debt secured by a mortgage bond. 
41   Act 32 of 1944. 
42   See in general Greig 2000 SALJ 622 and Boraine 2003 De Jure 217. C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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of time.
43 In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Panayiotts
44
 
 the court ruled 
that where a High Court refers a matter to a debt-counsellor for a 
recommendation in terms of section 85, the same court may deal with the 
matter in terms of section 86(7)(c) of the NCA.  
2.2.2    Effect of debt review or debt restructuring order or agreement 
Section 88 of the NCA sets out the effect of a pending debt review, a debt 
restructuring order or a debt rearrangement agreement. It provides that a 
consumer who has filed an application for debt review in terms of section 86(1) 
or who has alleged in court that he or she is over-indebted must not incur any 
further charges under a credit facility or enter into any further credit agreement 
until one of a number of specified events has occurred.
45 These events are the 
following:
46
(a)  the debt counsellor rejects the application for debt review and the 
prescribed time period for direct filing in terms of section 86(9) has expired 
without the consumer having so applied;
 
47
(b)  the court has determined that the consumer is not over-indebted or has 
rejected a debt counsellor's proposal or the consumer's application;
 
48
(c)  the court made an order for re-arrangement of the consumer's obligations 
or the consumer and his credit providers came to a re-arrangement 
agreement and the consumer fulfilled all of his obligations under the credit 
 or 
                                            
43   The current procedure does not make  these orders automatically reviewable after a 
specific time period has elapsed, nor does it place any duty on the court to order that a 
specific debt restructuring order will be subject to review after, for instance, a year since 
the order was granted.  
44   2009 (3) SA 363 (W) at par 17-19, For an earlier view to the contrary cf Van Heerden 2008 
TSAR 840. 
45   S 88(1). 
46   S 88(1)(a)-(c). 
47   S 88(1)(a). 
48   S 88(1)(b).  C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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agreements as re-arranged, unless the consumer fulfilled the obligations 
by way of a consolidation agreement.
49
 
 
Where a consumer applies for debt review or where debt re-arrangement 
occurs whether by court or voluntary agreement with his credit providers the 
consequences for the credit provider are significant. Section 88(3) provides 
that, subject to section 86(9) and (10), a credit provider who receives notice of 
court proceedings contemplated in sections  83 or 85 or notice in terms of 
section 86(4)(b)(i) may not exercise or enforce by litigation or other judicial 
process any right or security under that credit agreement until:
50
 
 
(a)  the consumer is in default under the credit agreement;
51
(b)  one of the following has occurred: 
 and 
(i)  an event contemplated in section 88(1)(a) through to (c),
52
(ii)  the consumer defaults on any obligation in terms of a re-
arrangement agreed between the consumer and credit 
providers, or ordered by a court or the Tribunal.
 
or 
53
 
 
2.3  Reckless credit 
As indicated, the provisions of the NCA relating to reckless credit apply only to 
natural person consumers. Prior to entering into a credit agreement, a credit 
provider is obliged by the NCA to conduct a credit assessment to establish if a 
consumer understands his risks, costs, rights and obligations under the 
                                            
49   S 88(1)(c). S 88(2) provides that if a consumer fulfils obligations by way of a consolidation 
agreement as contemplated in s 88(1)(c) or s 88(2), the effect of s 88(1) continues until the 
consumer fulfils all of  the obligations under the consolidation agreement, unless the 
consumer again fulfils the obligations by way of a consolidation agreement. 
50   S 88(3). 
51   S 88(3)(a). 
52   S 88(3)(b)(i). 
53   S 88(3)(b)(ii).  C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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agreement and can actually afford the credit.
54 In terms of section 80, a credit 
agreement will be reckless if, at the time that the agreement was made,
55
 
 or at 
the time when the amount approved in terms of the agreement is increased, 
other than an increase in terms of section 119(4): 
(a)  the credit provider failed to conduct an assessment as required by 
section  81(2), irrespective of what the outcome of such an 
assessment might have been at the time,
56
(b)  the credit provider, having conducted an assessment as required 
by section 81(2), entered into the credit agreement with the 
consumer, despite the fact that the preponderance of information 
available to the credit provider indicated that: 
 or 
(i)  the consumer did not generally understand or appreciate 
his or her risks, costs or obligations under the proposed 
credit agreement,
57
(ii)  entering into that agreement would make the consumer 
over-indebted.
 or 
58
 
 
Section 83 gives a court the discretion, despite any provision of law or 
agreement to the contrary, in any court proceedings in which a credit 
agreement is being considered, to declare that a credit agreement is reckless. 
Section 83 appears to differ from section 85 in the sense that a court may suo 
motu declare a credit agreement reckless in terms of section 83 whereas a 
court can declare a consumer over-indebted in terms of section 85 only if it is 
alleged that the consumer is over-indebted. If a court declares that a credit 
agreement is reckless in terms of sections 80(1)(a) or 80(1)(b)(i), it may make 
an order setting aside all or part of the consumer's rights and obligations under 
                                            
54   S 81. 
55   See Scholtz et al (n 2) par 11.4.4. The crucial time for determining whether or not credit 
was recklessly extended is the time of entry into the agreement, not the time at which the 
issue of reckless credit is raised. 
56   S 80(1)(a). 
57   S 80(1)(b)(i). 
58   S 80(1)(b)Iii). C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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that agreement, as the court determines to be just and reasonable in the 
circumstances.
59  Alternatively, it may make an order suspending
60
 
 the force 
and effect of that specific credit agreement in accordance with section 
83(3)(b)(i).  
During the period that the force and effect of a credit agreement is suspended 
in terms of the NCA, section 84(1) provides that the consumer is not required to 
make any payment required under the agreement; no interest, fee or other 
charge under the agreement may be charged to the consumer; and the credit 
provider's rights under the agreement, or under any law in respect of that 
agreement, are unenforceable, despite any law to the contrary. In accordance 
with section 84(2), after a suspension of the force and effect of a credit 
agreement all of the respective rights and obligations of the credit provider and 
the consumer under that agreement are revived,  and are fully enforceable 
except to the extent that a court may order otherwise, and no amount may be 
charged to the consumer by the credit provider with respect to any interest, fee 
or other change that could not be charged during the suspension in terms of 
section 84(1)(b).  If, however, a court declares that a credit agreement is 
reckless in terms of section 80(1)(b)(ii), it must further consider whether or not 
the consumer is over-indebted at the time of the court proceedings.
61 If the 
court then concludes that the consumer is over-indebted it may make an order 
suspending the force and effect of that credit agreement until a date determined 
by the court when making the order of suspension. In addition it may then also 
restructure the consumer's obligations under any other credit agreements in 
accordance with section 87.
62
 
 
The significance of a determination of reckless credit by a court is that it has the 
effect that a consumer can in some instances obtain significant debt relief, for 
                                            
59   S 83(2)(a). 
60   See s 84(1) and (2) as discussed below.  
61   S 83(3)(a). 
62   See discussion above. C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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instance by the setting aside of the agreement, or at the very least the 
suspension of the agreement and the  restructuring of his other credit 
agreement debt. The fact that a court can also suo motu raise the issue of 
reckless credit in proceedings in which a credit agreement is being considered 
further has the effect that a consumer may, at the initiative of the court, 
eventually be granted debt relief in the form of setting aside of the relevant 
credit agreement, for instance,  or in the form of the  suspension of that 
agreement and the restructuring of his other credit agreement debt.  
 
 
3  Does the NCA exclude the application of the Insolvency Act 
regarding credit agreements in general? 
Section 2(1) of the NCA provides that the Act must be interpreted in a manner 
that gives effect to the purposes set out in section 3. However, section 2(7) 
provides that, except as specifically set out in or necessarily implied by the Act, 
its provisions are not to be construed as limiting, amending, repealing or 
otherwise altering any provision of any other Act. 
 
In none of the sections in the NCA is there any specific mention of the 
Insolvency Act. Schedule I to the Act sets out the rules regarding conflicting 
legislation. If the argument is that compulsory sequestration of a consumer in 
accordance with the provisions of the Insolvency Act is in direct conflict with the 
provisions of the NCA relating to debt review and debt restructuring which is 
focused on satisfaction of all responsible financial obligations, one would at 
least expect either a direct provision dealing with the issue, or at the very least 
that a conflict resolution rule be provided for in Schedule I to the Act. However, 
no mention of the Insolvency Act is made in Schedule I. 
 
It is submitted that if the legislature intended the provisions of the  NCA to 
override the conflicting provisions of the Insolvency Act, it would have expressly 
stated so in Schedule I. The only reasonable inference is thus that it was not C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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the legislature's intention in the event of conflict between the Insolvency Act 
and the NCA that the latter should prevail as a rule. It is clear from Schedule 2 
that the legislature was, however, aware of and did consider the Insolvency Act. 
It is further submitted that Schedule 2 of the NCA has a significant bearing on 
the intention of the legislature with regard to the application of the Insolvency 
Act. In the very first column of Schedule 2 it is provided that section 84 of the 
Insolvency Act should be amended by: 
 
(a)  the substitution for the heading of the following heading:  
"Special provisions in case of goods delivered to a debtor in terms 
of an instalment agreement"; and 
(b)  the substitution for the opening clause of subsection (1) of the 
following words:  "If any property was delivered to a person 
(hereinafter referred to as the debtor) under a transaction that is 
an instalment agreement contemplated in paragraph (a), (b) and 
(c)(i) of the definition of instalment agreement set out in section 1, 
of the National Credit Act 2005". 
 
Section 84 of the Insolvency Act affords a credit provider who has sold property 
to a consumer in terms of an instalment agreement in respect of which 
ownership is reserved until payment of all amounts due, on sequestration of the 
consumer, a hypothec over the property which secures his claim for the 
balance outstanding under the agreement.
63
                                            
63   Nagel et al Commercial Law par 34.66. See also Sharrock et al Hockly's Insolvency Law 
(2007) par 7.2.8. 
  Such a creditor provider thus 
ranks as a secured creditor in the insolvent estate of the consumer. It appears 
illogical that a legislature which intends to oust the working of insolvency law 
with regard to a consumer who is under debt review or subject to a debt 
restructuring order or agreement fails to provide expressly that the insolvency 
law will not apply, and furthermore proceeds to amend the provision in the 
Insolvency Act  relating to the credit provider's hypothec with regard to an C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
38/161 
 
instalment agreement. One can only reasonably conclude that this indicates 
that the legislature did not intend to oust the application of insolvency law. 
 
In the absence of an express provision ousting the application of the Insolvency 
Act, it might thus be argued that the amendment of section 84 of the Insolvency 
Act  militates against a finding that the legislature intended to oust the 
application of the  Insolvency Act  by necessary implication. It is further 
submitted that the application of the Insolvency Act  is not excluded by 
necessary implication as any construction in terms of which it is concluded that 
a pending debt review or a debt restructuring order, or agreement, is a bar to 
sequestration can lead to absurdity. Such a conclusion may even result in the 
unequal treatment of credit providers, many of whom, such as in the instance of 
instalment agreements or mortgage bonds, would have been secured creditors 
on insolvency. It further gives rise to unequal treatment of debtors, allowing 
some an undeserved payment holiday which might span over years whereas 
others, whilst having to live with the impediments of insolvency, may qualify for 
a debt discharge on rehabilitation, which can in certain instances occur within a 
relatively short period of time.
64
 
 
It is foreseeable that there will be consumers who have debt that falls within the 
ambit of the NCA as well as debt to which the NCA does not apply. The 
prohibition against exercising or enforcing rights or security under a credit 
agreement which is subject to debt review applies only to credit providers who 
are party to a credit agreement that falls within the scope of the NCA and is 
eligible for the debt review procedure. This does not bar a creditor who has a 
claim that does not constitute a credit agreement covered by the NCA, for 
example a delictual claim, from applying for the sequestration of the debtor. To 
prevent such a creditor from sequestrating  a consumer merely because the 
consumer is under debt review with regard to a credit agreement to which the 
aforesaid creditor is not a party would amount to an unjustified deprivation of 
                                            
64    See Evans 2001 SA Merc LJ 503. C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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his right to sequestrate an insolvent debtor to the advantage of the group of 
creditors as a whole. 
 
Further, it would have the effect that a debtor who is under administration in 
terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, which is also a remedy that 
provides for debt restructuring, may be sequestrated
65
 
 but not one whose credit 
agreement debt is being restructured in accordance with the NCA. The irony is 
that administration applications have a monetary cap of R50 000, which means 
that the chances of succeeding with the sequestration of a person under 
administration will be slim as there may not be advantage to creditors. 
 
4  Effect of section 88(3) of the NCA on application of Insolvency Act 
As indicated, the provisions of section 88(3) apply only to credit providers who 
want to exercise and enforce their rights under a credit agreement
66
 
 by means 
of litigation or a judicial process,  and not to any other creditors. Once the 
question as to whether or not the NCA excludes the application of the 
Insolvency Act  in general is answered in the negative, it needs to be 
ascertained if section 88(3) of the NCA specifically prevents a credit provider 
from applying for the sequestration of his or her consumer-debtor who is under 
debt review, or subject to a debt restructuring order, or a debt restructuring 
agreement that was made a consent order in terms of section 138 of the NCA.  
From the perspective of the credit provider, an interpretation of the words "may 
not exercise or enforce by litigation or other judicial process any right or 
security under that credit agreement" as contained in section 88(3) is of utmost 
importance. It is submitted that the exercising of his or her rights under a credit 
agreement refers to the credit providers'  right to obtain payment from the 
                                            
65   S 74R of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
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consumer.
67  However, what exactly is meant by the word 'enforce'  in this 
context is not defined and is thus not clear in all respects. 'Enforce' is a term 
that has been introduced by the Act. Since the Act does not define the term, 
uncertainty exists as to its exact meaning. The ordinary meaning in legal 
parlance would be enforcement of payment or of another obligation, but in the 
context of the Act, Otto submits that it may well include enforcement in the 
sense of the credit provider's  using  any  of his remedies.
68  In other words, 
enforcement of the agreement means the exercise of his or her remedies by a 
credit provider.
69 This would for instance include the implementation of a lex 
commissoria.
70
 
 
'Litigation' usually refers to legal proceedings instituted in a court of law. It is 
submitted that "other judicial process" refers to judicial proceedings that do not 
formally occur in a court, such as arbitration. It may consequently be asked if 
sequestration proceedings amount to the exercising or enforcing of a right or 
security under a credit agreement by litigation or other  judicial process for 
purposes of section 88(3) of the NCA.  Although it must be conceded that 
sequestration may amount to some kind of enforcement, the view that 
compulsory sequestration merely amounts to enforcement by litigation or 
judicial process of a right or security under a credit agreement is simplistic and 
untenable. It has been held that an application for sequestration is not a 
process whereby the creditor claims payment of a debt.
71 Even though this is a 
debatable issue and though sequestration proceedings also be viewed as a 
collective debt collection device  too, it should be borne in mind that 
sequestration may be used to achieve more objectives within the ambit of debt 
relationships than merely the collection of debt.
72
                                            
67   Otto National Credit Act explained 87. 
 For instance, sequestration 
68   Ibid. 
69   Ibid. 
70   Ibid. 
71   WP Kooperatief Bpk v Louw 1995 (4) SA 4 (O). 
72   In Samsudin v De Villiers Berrange [2006] SCA 79 (RSA) at par 19 the SCA approved of 
an earlier dictum  in  Ex Parte B Z Stegmann 1902 TS 40,  47 that  '[a]n order of 
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affects not only  the debtor's assets but also affects the debtor personally, 
restricting his capacity and freedom to enter into contracts, to follow a chosen 
vocation, to litigate and to hold office.
73
 
 There may also be other compelling 
reasons for obtaining a sequestration order against a particular consumer-
debtor, as in the instance where other creditors are in the process of depleting 
his or her assets by means of judgment, attachment and sale in execution that 
may be to the prejudice of the abovementioned credit provider, and utilising the 
procedures provided for by insolvency law to carry out interrogations and to 
trace assets. It is thus submitted that 'enforce' for purposes of section 88(3) 
should be interpreted restrictively with reference to Part C of Chapter 6 of the 
Act, which bears the heading "debt enforcement by judgment or repossession". 
As such it will therefore not include insolvency proceedings. Nevertheless, it is 
abundantly clear from section 88(3) that such a credit provider may enforce his 
rights when the consumer-debtor defaults on his rearrangement and whatever 
the circumstances, like any other creditor-applicant, he will still have to meet all 
of  the requirements set for compulsory sequestration before a court will 
consider the granting of a sequestration order. 
 
5  Insolvency Law 
5.1  Introduction 
A debtor
74  may  be  either commercially or factually insolvent. Commercial 
insolvency entails that a debtor is unable to pay his debts.
75
                                                                                                                               
execution, affecting not only the rights of the two litigants but also third parties, and 
involves the distribution of the insolvent's property to various creditors, while restricting 
those creditors' ordinary remedies and imposing disabilities on the insolvent.' It is thus also 
clear from this passage that we are not dealing with ordinary debt enforcement in a case of 
sequestration.  
 The legal test for 
insolvency for the purposes of sequestration proceedings is usually the balance 
73   Sharrock et al (n 63) 5. 
74   For the purposes of this discussion the term 'debtor' is limited to natural persons who 
qualify as consumers for the purposes of the NCA, although the term 'debtor' as defined in 
s 2 of the Insolvency Act includes some other types of debtors as well. 
75   Sharrock et al (n 63) par 1.1. C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
42/161 
 
sheet test, namely, whether or not the debtor's liabilities, fairly estimated, 
exceed his assets, fairly valued.
76 In the case of voluntary surrender the debtor 
must inter alia prove that his or her liabilities exceed the value of his or her 
assets. In the case of compulsory sequestration a creditor may have good 
reason for believing that the debtor is insolvent, but he or she will usually not be 
in a position to prove that the debtor's liabilities exceed his or her assets.
77 
Consequently the legislature has designated certain acts or omissions by a 
debtor as acts of insolvency and if the creditor can establish that the debtor has 
committed one or more of these 'acts'  he or she may seek an order 
sequestrating the debtor's  estate without having to prove that the debtor is 
actually insolvent.
78 It thus follows that a debtor's estate may in some cases be 
sequestrated even though he or she is technically solvent.
79
 
 
Once an order of sequestration is granted, a concursus creditorum  is 
established and the interest of the creditors as a group enjoys preference over 
the interests of individual creditors.
80 This principle was explained as follows by 
Innes CJ in Walker v Syfret:
81
 
 
The object of the [Insolvency Act] is to ensure a due distribution of assets among 
creditors in the order of their preference…The sequestration order crystallizes the 
insolvent's position; the hand of the law is laid upon the estate, and at once the 
rights of the general body of creditors have to be taken into consideration. No 
transaction can thereafter be entered into with regard to estate matters by a single 
creditor to the prejudice of the general body. 
 
                                            
76   Venter v Volkskas Ltd 1973 (3) SA 175 (T) 179; Ex parte Harmse 2005 (1) SA 323 (N) 
325. 
77   Sharrock et al (n 63) par 3.1.2. 
78   Ibid. See De Villiers v Maursen Properties (Pty) Ltd 1983 (4) SA 670 (T) 676. Significantly, 
it has been held that a debtor who applies for an administration order in terms of s 74 of 
the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 is obliged to state that he cannot pay any of his 
debts, and hence usually commits an act of insolvency in terms of s 8(g) of the Insolvency 
Act in the process. Volkskas Bank ('n Divisie van Absa Bank Beperk) v Pietersen 1993 (1) 
SA 312 (C) 316. It is submitted that a notice to a creditor that a consumer-debtor is bound 
to go for debt review may also  amount to an  act of insolvency,  although the mere 
commission of an act of insolvency is not in itself sufficient to warrant the granting of a 
compulsory sequestration order.  
79   Ibid. See DP Du Plessis Prokureurs v Van Aarde 1999 (4) SA 1333 (T) 1335. 
80   Richter v Riverride Estates (Pty) Ltd 1946 OPD 209, 233. 
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The main objective of a sequestration order is to secure the orderly and 
equitable distribution of a debtor's assets where they are insufficient to meet 
the claims of all his creditors.
82 The legal machinery that comes into operation 
on sequestration is designed to ensure that whatever assets the debtor has are 
liquidated and distributed among all of  his creditors in accordance with a 
predetermined (and fair) order of preference.
83 It should, however, be noted 
that despite the impediments inherent in being declared insolvent, insolvency 
has the advantage of eventually affording a consumer debt relief in the form of 
a discharge.
84
 
 
The Insolvency Act provides for two forms of sequestration, namely voluntary 
surrender (where the debtor surrenders his estate on his own initiative) and 
compulsory sequestration (where a creditor applies to have the debtor 
sequestrated).  
 
5.2  Voluntary surrender 
The court has a discretion to accept the voluntary surrender of a debtor's estate 
and grant a sequestration order if it is satisfied that: 
 
(a)  the debtor is insolvent; 
(b)  there is sufficient free residue to defray the costs of sequestration; 
(c)  it will be to the advantage of creditors; and 
(d)  the formalities in section 4 of the Insolvency Act  have been 
complied with. 
 
The onus of proving that these requirements have been met rests upon the 
debtor. 
 
                                            
82   Sharrock et al (n 63) par 1.2. 
83   Ibid. 
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5.3  Compulsory sequestration 
The court has a discretion to grant an application for the sequestration of a 
debtor's estate if it is satisfied that: 
 
(a)  the applicant is a creditor (or his agent) who has a liquidated 
claim against the debtor for not less than R100 or two or more 
creditors (or their agents) who have liquidated claims against the 
debtor amounting, in aggregate, to not less than R200;
85
(b)  the debtor has committed an act of insolvency or is insolvent;
 
86
(c)  there is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of 
creditors of the debtor if his estate is sequestrated;
 
87
(d)  prescribed formalities
 and 
88
 
 have been complied with. 
The onus of satisfying the court on these matters rests throughout on the 
sequestrating creditor and there is no onus on the debtor to disprove any 
elements.
89
 
 
5.4  The court's discretion in insolvency applications and the 
advantage of creditor's requirement 
Even if the court is satisfied that the aforesaid requirements have been 
established on a balance of probabilities, it is not bound to grant a final order for 
sequestration. Each case must be decided on its own facts and in each case 
the court has an overriding discretion that must be exercised judicially and upon 
a consideration of all the relevant circumstances.
90
                                            
85   S 9(1) of the Insolvency Act. 
 It is submitted that each 
debt situation is unique and that the courts should follow a common sense 
86   See the test for insolvency as stated in the Volkskas case above. 
87   S 12(1) of the Insolvency Act. 
88   S 9 of the Insolvency Act. 
89   Braithwaite v Gilbert 1984 (4) SA 717 (W) 718. 
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approach to decide if sequestration will be the best solution to a particular debt 
situation in a specific instance. 
 
The advantage of the creditors plays a pivotal role in the exercise of the court's 
discretion. It is often on this basis that a court will decline to grant an order for 
voluntary surrender or compulsory sequestration even though all of the other 
requirements for it may have been satisfied. It should also be noted that the 
advantage requirement is more stringent in the case of an application for 
voluntary surrender than in the case of compulsory sequestration, where it is 
necessary merely to allege that reason exists to believe that it would be to the 
advantage of his creditors if the debtor's estate is sequestrated.
91  In 
determining such an advantage, the question is if a "substantial portion" of the 
creditors,
92  determined according to the value of their claims, will derive 
advantage from sequestration.
93 In order to be to the advantage of creditors, 
sequestration must "yield at the least, a not negligible dividend".
94 If after the 
costs of sequestration have been met there is no payment to creditors, or only 
a negligible one, there is no advantage.
95
 
 
It should be noted that the test for advantage to creditors is relaxed by the 
requirement that the court must merely be satisfied that there is reason to 
believe that sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors.
96
                                            
91   S10(c) of the Insolvency Act. 
 However, it is 
submitted that proving advantage to creditors is not restricted to calculating a 
not negligible dividend based on the estimated proceeds of a sale of assets in 
the debtor's possession at the time when a sequestration application is 
92   Sharrock  et al (n  63) par 3.1.3 "Creditors means  all, or at least the general body of 
creditors". 
93   Ibid. Trust Wholesalers and Woollens (Pty) Ltd v Mackan 1954 (2) SA 109 (N); Fesi v 
ABSA Bank Ltd 2000 (1) SA 499 (C). 
94   Trust Wholesalers and Woollens (Pty) Ltd v Mackan 1954 (2) SA 109 (N) 111. 
95   Ibid. London Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nair  1957 (3) SA 591 (D); Ex parte  Steenkamp and 
related cases 1996 (3) SA 822 (W). 
96   See Meskin v Friedman 1948 (2) SA 555 (W) 558 where Roper J stated: "The facts put 
before the court must satisfy it that there is a reasonable prospect – not necessarily a 
likelihood, but a prospect which is not too remote – that some pecuniary benefit will result 
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contemplated. It should also be borne in mind that there might in certain 
instances be a reasonable prospect that the trustee, by invoking aspects of the 
machinery of the Insolvency Act  such as the setting aside of impeachable 
transactions provided for in sections 26 to 30 after an investigation and inquiry, 
will unearth or recover assets that will yield a pecuniary benefit for creditors.
97
Clearly, strong resistance against an application for sequestration by creditors 
should also direct the court in exercising its discretion. 
 
In the case of compulsory sequestration the situation is sometimes that some 
creditors have obtained judgment and even writs of execution against some of 
the assets of the debtor. This might jeopardise the position of other creditors 
who are not yet in a  position to enforce their claims against the debtor. 
Sometimes such a creditor will indicate in an application for compulsory 
sequestration that it would be to the advantage of the creditors if a 
sequestration order is granted since it will amount to a fair distribution of the 
proceeds of the available assets amongst the creditors. 
 
 
6  The role of over-indebtedness and reckless credit in insolvency 
proceedings 
6.1  Ex parte Ford
98
In the recent decision of the Western Cape High Court in Ex parte Ford three 
applications for voluntary surrender served before the unopposed motion court. 
It appeared that a major portion of each applicant's liabilities consisted of credit 
agreement debt to which the NCA applied.
 
99
                                            
97   BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Furstenburg 1966 (1) SA 717 (O) 720; Walker v Walker 
[1998] 2 All SA 382 (W) 387; Dunlop Tyres (Pty) v Brewitt 1999 (2) SA 580 (W) 583; Lynn 
& Main Inc v Naidoo 2006 (1) SA 59 (N) 68-69; Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Services v Hawker Air Services (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner, South African Revenue Services 
v Hawker Aviation Partnership 2006 (4) SA 292 (SCA) 306. 
 The court found this debt to be 
strikingly disproportionate in relation to the relatively modest income of each of 
98   2009 (3) SA 376 (WCC); also reported in [2009] JOL 23412 (WCC). 
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the applicants.
100 In each of the applications it was averred that the applicants 
had "become insolvent by misfortune and due to circumstances beyond their 
control, without fraud or dishonesty on their part".
101 The court consequently 
indicated that grounds for cogent suspicion of at least some degree of reckless 
credit extension presented themselves strongly on the disclosed facts in each 
of the applications.
102  It indicated that one of the objects of the NCA is to 
discourage reckless credit and referred to the provisions dealing with the 
same.
103 The court then referred to its powers in terms of section 85 of the NCA 
and pointed out that an evaluation by a debt counsellor could lead to one or 
more of the consumers'  credit agreements being declared reckless credit, 
resulting in the setting aside of the agreements or suspension of the force and 
effect thereof.
104
 
 
In view of the aforementioned the court deemed it fit to call upon counsel for the 
applicants to present argument as to why the over-indebtedness of the 
applicants should not more appropriately be addressed by using the 
mechanisms of the NCA "instead of the blunter instrument afforded in terms of 
the voluntary surrender remedy under the Insolvency Act".
105  The court 
indicated that in its opinion section 85 is cast in very wide terms as is evidenced 
by the words "in any court proceedings".
106
                                            
100  Ibid par 3. 
 Thus the limitation of section 85 to 
101  Ibid. 
102  Ibid. The allegation of absence of fraud by the consumer caused the court to assume that 
in applying for the credit which became the unaffordable burden that drove the applicants 
to seek the surrender of their estates the credit grantors involved were fully informed of the 
apparent limits of the applicant's inability to service the debt,  or could easily have 
ascertained the position had they made reasonable enquiries before granting the loan or 
credit facilities in question. 
103  Ibid par 4-7. 
104  Ibid par 9. 
105  Ibid par 10. 
106  Ibid  par 12. See also par 11,  where counsel for the applicant pointed out that the 
legislature had been pertinently cognisant of the Insolvency Act when it enacted the NCA, 
as is apparent from the amendment of s 84 of the Insolvency Act by Schedule 2 of the 
NCA. Counsel stressed this connection, that the legislature had not seen fit to make any 
changes to the provisions of the Insolvency Act  concerning voluntary surrender. He 
submitted that s 85 of the NCA was in any event not applicable in proceedings for 
voluntary surrender under the Insolvency Act, relying mainly on the argument that there 
were no credit agreements before the court in the current matter. In this regard he thus C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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proceedings in which a credit agreement is being considered does not imply 
that the proceedings in question are restricted only to those in which the 
enforcement of a credit agreement is in issue.
107 The court pointed out that in 
terms of the Insolvency Act "a court has to be fully informed of the applicant's 
proprietary situation
108 and that an applicant for voluntary surrender must also 
satisfy the court that the surrender of his estate will be to the advantage of 
creditors".
109 It remarked that these considerations, in a matter like any of the 
three applications before the court,  where over-indebtedness is almost 
exclusively related to debt arising from credit agreements, require the court to 
take the existence and effect of those agreements into account.
110 It held that 
the word 'consider' referred to in section 85 has a broad connotation: in context 
it denotes that the court proceedings contemplated by the provision must be 
proceedings in which a credit agreement is taken into account as a relevant 
matter.
111 The court remarked that the fact that the NCA leaves the provisions 
of the Insolvency Act  regarding voluntary surrender generally unaffected 
acknowledges that insolvency can arise in a great variety of circumstances, 
many of them quite unrelated to over-indebtedness as defined in the NCA.
112 
Therefore it was of the opinion that insolvents whose misfortune arises out of 
credit agreement transactions would be well advised for the reasons indicated 
hereinafter to take into account the policy and objects of the NCA and also the 
special remedies provided by it before opting to apply for the surrender of their 
estates under the Insolvency Act rather than availing them of the provisions 
under  the NCA.
113
                                                                                                                               
argued that s 85 applies only to instances where the consumer resists a credit grantor's 
claim for performance in terms of a credit agreement on grounds of over-indebtedness. 
However, the court did not agree with these arguments.  
  The court pointed out that in all three applications the 
applicants filed supplementary affidavits in which they confirmed having been 
made aware of the court's desire to hear argument on the application of section 
107  Ibid. 
108  Ibid par 13 with reference to Bertelsmann et al Mars par 3.15. 
109  Ibid. 
110  Ibid. 
111  Ibid. 
112  Ibid par 14. 
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85 of the NCA in the context of  the apparent character of their over-
indebtedness.
114 Each of them testified that they had indeed considered debt 
counselling but set out in detail how financially impracticable an arrangement of 
debt repayment would be.
115
 
 
However, the court was dissatisfied as there was no indication on the evidence 
in any of the three applications that consideration was given in the context of 
debt counselling to anything beyond an administered debt collection.
116  In 
particular there was no indication that the debt counsellors engaged by the 
applicants gave any consideration to obtaining declarations of reckless 
credit.
117 Despite advocating its powers in terms of section 85, the court still 
held that, in view of the applicants' resistance to assistance in terms of section 
85 of the NCA, it was not going to refer their credit agreements for investigation 
and report by a debt counsellor
118 and declared that it was nevertheless open 
to the applicants to take the necessary steps in this regard on their own 
initiative. In addition, the court indicated that it was not prepared to exercise its 
discretion in favour of granting the applications for voluntary surrender due to 
the applicants' failure to properly explain why their credit agreement debt was 
not amenable to administration under the NCA to their own benefit as well as to 
that of their credit-granting creditors who acted responsibly, as distinct from 
recklessly, in extending credit.
119
                                            
114  Ibid par 15. 
  The court considered it as its duty, in the 
exercise of its discretion in cases like the current, to have proper regard to 
giving due effect to the public policy reflected in the NCA, which gives 
preference to the  rights of responsible credit grantors over reckless credit 
115  Ibid. In this regard, each of them sets out in tabulated form how the application of their 
disposable income over the next seven years to service their current debt would still leave 
them heavily indebted at the end of the period. It is not clear why the court did not find this 
information helpful. 
116  Ibid par 16. 
117  Ibid. 
118  Ibid par 17. 
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grantors, and supports full satisfaction, as far as possible, by consumers of all 
financial obligations.
120
 
  
In closing, the court indicated that the argument that in essence it is for the 
applicants to choose the form of relief that suits their convenience by 
mechanically and superficially satisfying the relevant statutory requirements 
under the Insolvency Act  is misdirected, especially where the grant of a 
selected remedy is discretionary,
121 and emphasised that the primary object of 
voluntary surrenders is not the relief of harassed debtors.
122 The court indicated 
that there is moreover a  consonance between the objects of the relevant 
provisions of the NCA and the Insolvency Act, that is, "not to deprive creditors 
of their claims but merely to regulate the manner and extent of their 
payment".
123  However, on the incomplete facts disclosed in the current 
applications the court held that it was left with the impression that the 
machinery of the NCA is the more appropriate mechanism to be used and 
consequently refused the applications.
124
 
 
6.2  Implications for insolvency proceedings and debt relief in general 
Whether or not other divisions of the High Court are going to follow the decision 
in Ex parte Ford remains to be seen. However, if the said decision can be taken 
as an indication of the manner in which insolvency proceedings where the 
consumer has credit agreement debt will be treated in future, it is clear that 
over-indebtedness and reckless credit may have particular significance with 
regard to the ability of the applicant to opt for either voluntary surrender or 
compulsory sequestration to satisfy the court that sequestration is the option 
most preferable in terms of advantage to creditors where the debt consists 
largely of credit agreements regulated in terms of the NCA. 
                                            
120  Ibid par 20. 
121  Ibid par 19 with reference to Ex parte Hayes 1970 (4) SA (NC) 96C. 
122  Ibid par 21 with reference to Ex parte Pillay; Mayet v Pillay 1955 (2) SA 309 (N) 311E. 
123  Ibid with reference to Nel v Body Corporate of the Seaways Building 1996 (1) SA 131 
(SCA) 138E. 
124  Ibid par 21-22. C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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As an allegation of over-indebtedness is always an inherent issue in insolvency 
proceedings, an insolvency court would in principle be entitled to invoke the 
provisions of section 85 of the NCA in cases where the consumer has credit 
agreement debt, on the basis that section 85 applies to any proceedings in 
which a credit agreement is being considered. The court is not obliged to do so 
but has a discretion, as is indicated by the use of the word 'may' in section 85. 
 
Where the credit agreement debt appears to be disproportionate to the 
consumer's income, thereby giving rise to a suspicion of reckless credit 
granting, an insolvency court may invoke its discretion in terms of section 85 to 
refer the matter for debt review, with the instruction that the possibility of having 
certain credit agreements declared reckless credit be investigated. If Ford 
stands, debt counsellors may be well advised to make it clear during debt 
review that they have not only considered the over-indebtedness of the 
consumer, but also if any of his credit agreements appear to be reckless, failing 
which a matter which had served before a debt counsellor for debt review might 
be referred back for further investigation, thus wasting costs and time for the 
already overburdened consumer. 
 
It is submitted that insolvency courts will probably choose to invoke the 
provisions of section 85 of the NCA within the broader context of their discretion 
to grant or refuse sequestration based on the question of advantage to 
creditors. The NCA has clearly created debt relief remedies which may have 
the effect that a consumer whose financial misfortune was brought about by 
credit agreement debt might escape his debt trap and impending insolvency if 
afforded an opportunity to pay off his debt over an extended period of time. 
However, it is shortsighted to take the hard and fast view that full satisfaction of 
debts as envisaged by debt restructuring in terms of section 86(7)(c) will always 
be the preferable option in terms of advantage to creditors. Advantage to 
creditors is about more than just a monetary dividend and is essentially a de 
facto  test that has to be determined with reference to the peculiar C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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circumstances of each case. As such a court may find that in particular 
circumstances creditors may be better served by insolvency proceedings that 
allow them a payment of a substantial portion of debt owing to them more 
quickly than by a debt restructuring that might yield a slightly better payment 
but which spans over the lifetime of the consumer (and  which,  unlike 
insolvency, does not allow for an eventual debt discharge). It might be that a 
creditor needs to collect money owed by the consumer to pay his own creditors 
in order to ward off sequestration of his estate. 
 
It is further submitted that intervention by creditors in insolvency proceedings 
could also be indicative of the presence or absence of advantage to creditors, 
and of whether or not the debt relief remedies afforded by the NCA should be 
preferred above sequestration. A creditor may for instance decide to intervene 
in voluntary surrender proceedings if he is of the opinion that a consumer who 
has not yet been for debt review must do so in order to determine the 
advantages of debt restructuring,  or of having credit agreements declared 
reckless. Where the consumer is under a debt restructuring order but wishes to 
apply for voluntary surrender, an order to ensure that his debt is paid within a 
reasonable time enabling him to qualify for a debt discharge and a fresh start, 
creditors might intervene if they are of the opinion that their interests (their 
advantage) would be better served by maintaining debt restructuring payments 
under the NCA. 
 
In compulsory sequestration proceedings a creditor would also be able to 
intervene and argue that a consumer with credit agreement debt who has not 
yet been for debt review before the sequestration application was brought 
should be referred for debt review so that the court can be fully appraised of the 
advantages of having his credit agreement debt restructured and/or declared 
reckless, in order to make an informed decision when considering the issue of 
advantage to creditors in the exercise of its discretion whether to grant the 
sequestration order or not. A creditor can also intervene in compulsory 
sequestration proceedings in respect of a consumer who is already subject to a C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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debt restructuring order on the basis that maintaining payments in terms of the 
restructuring order would serve the advantage of creditors better than 
sequestration. 
 
Although the Ford-case is correct in that courts do have a discretion to grant 
sequestration orders or  not, especially by considering the advantage-for-
creditors requirement, the judgement is also an indication that some judges still 
remain extremely pro-creditor orientated and that the NCA has to some extent 
entrenched this position.
125  This must be seen against the backdrop of 
international trends and guidelines regarding debt relief measures that propose 
the availability of a discharge for debtors even outside the strict confines of 
insolvency law.
126  Such a discharge may either follow a proper bankruptcy 
proceeding like sequestration in our legal system, where the debtor loses his 
estate assets (excluding exempt and excluded assets), or an alternative debt 
relief measure outside insolvency law that provides for the rescheduling of the 
repayment period. In the latter instance the repayment period is usually subject 
to a time-limitation in order to prevent an overburdened debtor from remaining 
in debt for life – debt that will in many instances not be repaid in full in any 
event.
127  There thus still seems to be a  need in South African law to find 
suitable alternative debt relief measures that also provide for a discharge 
outside the ambit of insolvency law under certain circumstances.
128 The notion 
of assetless estates must also be addressed within the ambit of such reform 
initiatives.
129
                                            
125  See for instance R v Meer 1957 (3) SA 614 (N) 619 and Ex Parte Pillay; Mayet v Pillay 
1955 (2) SA 309 (N) 311E and the recent Ex parte Ford 2009 (3) SA 376 (WCC) par 21. 
 
126 See the Insol International: Consumer Debt Report (2001) referred to by Boraine (n 42) 
238; and Calitz 2007 Obiter 397 regarding the latest trends and law reform in the United 
States.  
127  See ch 13 of the US Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (as amended); Boraine (n 42) 235; 
Bertelsmann et al (n 108) 4; and Calitz (n 127) 397.  
128  See for instance Boraine and Roestoff 1993 De Jure 229; Boraine and Roestoff 1994 De 
Jure 31; Boraine and Roestoff 2002 INSOL 1; Boraine (n 42) 217; Evans (n 64) 485; and 
Bertelsmann et al (n 108) 1-5. 
129  See Roestoff and Renke 2005 Obiter 561; and Roestoff and Renke 2006 Obiter 98 where 
a case is also argued regarding the possible use of the NINA principles regarding the 
treatment of assetless estates in England and Wales. C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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It must nevertheless be conceded that the NCA is a laudable attempt by the 
legislature to address over-indebtedness by firstly trying to prevent it, or where 
it does occur by providing some further mechanisms – albeit not sufficient in all 
respects – to address the situation.
130 The plight of debtors who are too poor to 
go bankrupt and who cannot succeed in obtaining an alternative debt relief 
measure like that in Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen
131 has not been addressed 
adequately by the NCA – despite its noble aims.
132
 
 
6.3  Compulsory sequestration 
In view of the Ford  decision it is now clearly a question if  the same 
considerations will apply in the case of compulsory sequestration where the 
debt is substantially credit agreement debt. It is submitted that a court will be at 
liberty to pose the same questions when exercising its discretion whether to 
grant the application or not. The fact, however, that a creditor brings the 
application may be a factor that may influence the court to exercise its 
discretion in favour of granting the order; that is, if all the requirements for such 
an order are met. If the application is viewed as a so-called friendly 
sequestration, the court may adhere more strictly to the Ford approach, since 
friendly sequestration is often frowned upon by the courts. 
 
6.4  Sequestration subsequent to restructuring or debt rearrangement 
In Ford the granting of a sequestration order was considered at a time when the 
debtors had not yet considered debt review as an option. It may of course 
happen that a debtor defaults on a debt restructuring following debt review. In 
such an instance a credit provider can proceed with individual litigation as the 
section 88(3) bar is lifted. Obviously, if grounds for compulsory sequestration 
                                            
130  Bertelsmann et al (n 108) 5. 
131  Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen (Automutual Investments (EC) (Pty) Ltd, Intervening Creditor) 
[2000] 2 All SA 485 (SE). 
132  See Evans (n 64) 485 for a discussion of this case and sources referred to in n 121 and 
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exist and the credit provider opts for that route, the debtor's inability to comply 
with the restructuring or rearrangement order may be a factor pointing towards 
sequestration as the better option in terms of the advantage of creditors' 
requirement. 
 
 
7  Conclusion 
With reference to the questions posed in the introduction to this article,
133 it 
may firstly be stated that the NCA does not specifically exclude the application 
of the Insolvency Act.
134 At the same time it is important to note that the NCA 
applies to credit agreements  regulated by it and contains certain debt relief 
measures for over-indebted consumer-debtors relating to such debt only.
135
                                            
133 See par 1 above. 
 It is 
nevertheless submitted that the NCA will significantly influence insolvency 
proceedings, for instance, as a result of the powers of a court in terms of 
section 85 to refer the matter to debt review and thereby to invoke the debt 
relief remedies afforded by the NCA in respect of over-indebtedness. As a 
result of such a referral the remedies in respect of reckless credit as set out in 
section 83 may also come into play. As such it may happen in specific cases 
that a court may within the broader context of advantage to creditors, in its 
discretion to grant or refuse a sequestration order exercise the 'sub-discretion' 
to order that a consumer who has not yet been for debt review should do so in 
order for the court to make an informed decision on the advantage requirement, 
or that a debt restructuring order be maintained as it appears to be more 
advantageous than sequestration. Where a creditor who does not have a credit 
agreement claim thus decides to sequestrate a consumer who has other debts 
that constitute credit agreements for purposes of the NCA, he might find his 
application thwarted by an intervening creditor who alleges that debt 
restructuring is the better option. 
134 See par 3 above. 
135 See par 2 above. C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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Secondly, it is submitted that the provisions of section 88(3) of the NCA apply 
only to credit providers who want to exercise and enforce their rights under a 
credit agreement by means of litigation or a judicial process and not to any 
other creditors.
136
 
 To this extent it has been argued that a credit provider may 
also bring an application for compulsory sequestration against a consumer-
debtor. Clearly such an applicant will have to meet the requirements set for 
such an application and convince the court that there is sufficient reason to 
grant a sequestration order in spite of a debt rearrangement. 
Thirdly, within its discretion to grant a sequestration order that is either based 
upon compulsory sequestration or voluntary surrender, a court may consider 
alternative options such as the debt review provided for by the NCA before 
granting such a sequestration order. If the Ford-judgement is anything to go by 
it is submitted that, especially in applications for voluntary surrender, applicant-
debtors will have to consider their options outside sequestration – especially 
the debt relief procedures provided for by the NCA –  before  making 
application.
137
 
  
Essentially it appears that the NCA has at least indirectly introduced a 
consideration of the possible advantages that may be yielded by the debt relief 
remedies in respect of over-indebtedness and reckless credit as yet another 
factor to be taken into account by a court when considering advantage to 
creditors as an integral part of exercising its discretion in insolvency 
proceedings. In order to prevent a waste of costs and time, a consumer who 
wishes to apply for voluntary surrender of his estate would therefore be well 
advised to consider going for debt review first and making sure that the debt 
counsellor also investigates the possibility of reckless credit. A credit provider 
who wishes to apply for sequestration knowing that a consumer is under debt 
                                            
136 See par 4 above. 
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review or debt restructuring might also save himself unnecessary costs and 
delay by setting out sufficient detail to convince the court that sequestration is 
the most advantageous option. One would nevertheless hope that courts when 
exercising their discretions in sequestration applications will follow a common-
sense approach by considering the best possible solution in every instance.
138
 
 
For instance, it does not appear from the Ford-case judgement that any of the 
creditors actually opposed the application. One wants to assume that the 
creditors involved in this case had weighed their options to collect the debt in 
other ways before deciding not to oppose the matter.  
There might also be a clash of interests where the debt situation of a particular 
consumer debtor consists of credit agreements as well as of other types of debt 
that are not regulated by the NCA, or where all of the debt amounts to credit 
agreements but with different credit providers. In the first instance a credit 
provider may for instance enjoy the benefit of a mere rescheduling  of the 
repayment of his debt following debt review, whilst the other creditor is unable 
to obtain payment. The credit provider may also be privy to more financial 
information regarding the consumer debtor, whilst the other creditor may want 
to use compulsory sequestration as a way of gathering information regarding 
the debtor and the fate of his assets.  
 
Although it must be conceded that the NCA will address the problem of over-
indebtedness to some extent – for instance by the reckless granting of credit, 
thus  prompting  credit providers to be more careful before making credit 
available to consumers who cannot afford it – the problem of over-indebtedness 
will remain, since many consumers who may have been credit-worthy at the 
time of obtaining credit will be influenced by economic realities that will impair 
their ability to repay such debt. It is clear that the purpose of the NCA is not to 
                                            
138  Although in a different context, the court in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales as 
discussed in par 2.1.1 above followed a commonsense approach by looking into the 
feasibility of referring a matter to a debt counsellor for a recommendation, where chances 
seemed to be slim that debt re-arrangement would rescue the debt situation of the 
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offer comprehensive relief to over-indebted debtors but merely to offer limited 
relief to some consumers who are subject to this Act. In fact, this type of relief 
will be effective only where a consumer still has the means or the potential to 
repay his debt in full if one of the prescribed relief options is granted to him in 
terms of the NCA.  
 
At present the only real statutory discharge offered to debtors remains  the 
rehabilitation that follows sequestration,  and it remains largely a policy 
consideration if our legal system should also offer a discharge to some over-
indebted debtors outside of this ambit. It is nevertheless submitted that the full 
spectrum of debt relief measures still needs further research with the view of 
establishing proper mechanisms with a clear application in order to deal with 
the variety of debt situations that may arise. This is especially needed since the 
debt relief measures of the NCA deal only with credit agreements in terms of 
the Act, and such measures do not provide for a time-limitation for repayment 
or a statutory discharge.  
 
The irony is that despite the NCA's  apparent aim to assist over-indebted 
consumers it often perpetuates their debt trap by failing to provide a debt 
discharge,  as opposed to the Insolvency Act  which, despite its apparent 
attempt to collectively further the advantage of creditors, also indirectly serves 
the interests of debtors by providing for a debt discharge, and gives meaning to 
the word 'rehabilitation'  by providing the possibility of a fresh start for over-
burdened consumers. It is submitted that only a proper empirical study will 
provide answers as to the efficacy of the new debt relief measures introduced 
by the NCA, and as to if they can really replace sequestration as an effective 
alternative. The same problems encountered  for instance by  administration 
orders in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act of 1944, that in 
many instances the extended repayment periods tend to increase the over-
indebtedness of many debtors rather than improve the situation,  may also 
occur within the ambit of the new debt relief measure. If a holistic approach 
were  followed, the role of debt counsellors could, for  instance, have been C VAN HEERDEN & A BORAINE    PER/PELJ 2009(12)3 
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extended to their assisting over-indebted consumers with all of their debts and 
directing  them towards the most effective debt relief device for each one's 
unique debt situation. 
 
Finally, it is clear that insolvency practitioners will  have to take note of the 
possible impact of the NCA on insolvency law in general,  and to  make the 
required adjustments. It nevertheless remains a pity that the legislature did not 
reform the full spectrum of debt relief measures and also simultaneously align it 
with the Insolvency Act. This is pertinently problematic since the NCA does not 
regulate all types of debt, and the interests of such creditors may clearly come 
into conflict with the interests of credit providers whose debt has been 
rearranged in terms of the Act. 
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